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Cooperative Bargaining Styles at FMCS:
A Movement Toward Choices
Carolyn Brommer*
George Buckingham**
Steven Loeffler***
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS") was cre-
ated in 1947 "in order to prevent or minimize interruptions of the free
flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes, to assist parties to labor
disputes in industries affecting commerce and settle such disputes through
conciliation and mediation."' While an array of subsequent statutory en-
actments have expanded the FMCS charter, the core mission of FMCS
has been, and remains, to assist labor and management to settle their dis-
putes through mediation as well as to promote the development of sound
and stable labor-management relationships. 2
The vision of how that mission will be realized has changed signifi-
cantly in response to changes in our society, to expanded knowledge of
conflict resolution and labor relations, and to lessons gathered by the na-
tion's mediators over a half-century of work with collective bargaining re-
lationships and dispute mediation interventions.
During FMCS' first twenty-five years, the adversarial labor-
management relationship model was so deeply ingrained in our minds that
it was the model of choice. Few even considered the possibility that other
options existed. Provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (as
amended) regarding contract negotiation, for example, were fashioned on
the adversarial model. Experienced negotiators in labor relations grew up
on the traditional adversarial model, as did mediators who had been ex-
perienced bargainers in their former lives. The adversarial model perme-
ated all aspects of labor-management relations, and it was evident even in
other sectors of society where bargaining took place. In order to fulfill its
* Commissioner, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
** Deputy Director, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
*** Commissioner, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
1. Taft-Hartley Act, 1947.
2. FMCS Mission Statement, available at http://www.fmcs.govlpubinfolBrochures/Put-
ting%2OCustome rs%2OFirst.htm (visited Apr. 11. 2002).
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mission statement, the focus at FMCS was twofold: first, provide effective
mediation assistance, usually in the last period of time prior to contract
expiration, during the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements; sec-
ond, provide training in negotiation skills to both labor and management
bargainers in the belief that the adversarial model was the appropriate
way to bargain, and that bargaining efficacy on both sides would be in-
creased by improving the practitioners' skills. The training proffered was
to educate the parties how to bargain effectively within the traditional
model, not "how to get the best of one's opponent." Mediators, ever
mindful of neutrality, encouraged interested parties to engage in joint
training. When joint training was declined, the mediators always offered
the same training to both groups.
By all accounts, this system of collective bargaining, with the adver-
sarial model as its foundation, worked. And, the reputation of federal
mediators was first built during this period through one successful inter-
vention at a time. For many relationships, it remains a viable model. Over
the last three years, FMCS mediators have provided assistance in an aver-
age of 5,275 traditional negotiations per year, and 93.4% were success-
fully concluded without an interruption toproduction.
However, under the adversarial model, symptoms of deteriorating la-
bor-management relationships that stemmed from failure to adequately ad-
dress problems during the term of the contracts were increasingly mani-
festing at the bargaining table. The number and intensity of non-economic
issues frequently grew to unwieldy dimensions. In a surprisingly large
number of bargaining relationships, mediation began to be used at every
round of negotiations. Many mediators were able to enumerate a number
of cases where the list of issues was so long, and the intensity of feeling
so high, that a work stoppage or lockout occurred before the parties got to
serious discussions about the economic issues. Further, in many of these
cases the level of rancor was so high that it prevented the parties from
engaging in effective negotiations regardless of the presence of a
mediator.
FMCS responded by developing a variety of interventions to be uti-
lized by parties during the life of collective bargaining agreements. The
avowed purpose was to solve problems and manage conflict that arose in
between contract negotiations to minimize the number of non-economic
issues that would arrive at the bargaining table. One such intervention, for
example, was increased promotion of the labor-management committee
("LMC") concept. In a functional LMC, a fairly regular group including
representatives from both labor and management would meet at regular
intervals, usually once a month, to address issues that would crop up dur-
466
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ing the normal administration of the collective bargaining agreement.
Training of committee members in LMC functioning, problem solving,
consensus decision-making, group dynamics, and conflict management
tools was provided by FMCS. In keeping with the adversarial mode,
mindset of the time, it was standard practice to suspend the LMC meet-
ings during the period of contract negotiations, since the cooperative prob-
lem-solving model of the LMC was inconsistent with the adversarial bar-
gaining model.
II DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING AT FMCS
The design and implementation of a new form of collective bargain-
ing, called Interest-Based Bargaining or "IBB," proved to be one of the
most important FMCS interventions to solve labor-management problems
and manage conflict. Some of the numerous synonyms for IBB help de-
scribe it with greater color and accuracy: Win-Win, Mutual Gains, Best
Practices, Principled Negotiations, and Integrative Bargaining are other
names for the basic cooperative process FMCS calls IBB. No matter how
it is described, three key elements stand out as critical to its development
and inception. First, in 1965, Walton and McKersie introduced the con-
cept of a dichotomous choice of bargaining styles, which they named
"distributive" and "integrative". 3 In a comprehensive discussion of each,
they examined the parameters, characteristics, and key variables of each
style of bargaining. Second, in 1983, Fisher and Ury, in Getting to Yes,
laid out the basic principles that underlie all current IBB models in use
today.4 Third, in 1989, Jerome T. Barrett developed the PAST model
(Principles, Assumptions, Steps, Techniques), which offered a formalized
win-win bargaining system and a training program.5 It was only after the
progression of Walton and McKersie, Fisher and Ury, and Barrett that
IBB was ready to be developed in a systematic, meaningful fashion with
real potential for implementation.
3. See generally ROBERT MCKEnsiE & RIcHARD NVALTON. A BAvIORAL THEORY OF Nno,-
TiAllONS (1965).
4. See generally ROGER FIsHER & WmiA URY. GEntu To YEs (1981).
5. See generally JERoNE T. BARRETT. PAS.T. is rue FutuRE - A MODEL FOR INTERESr-
BASED CouxcnvE BARGAmNG THAT WoRKs! (51 ed. 1998).
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III. THE PAST MODEL AND THE ORIGINS OF IBB
In 1989 and 1990, Barrett began to run pilot IBB programs using his
PAST model. In some of those efforts he worked in conjunction with
FMCS mediators in negotiations that had been identified as appropriate
for the process. Barrett also briefed FMCS mediators in a series of meet-
ings across the nation. An initial cadre of FMCS mediators began em-
ploying the process, training other mediators, and experimenting with
changes. Although FMCS statistics for that period of time did not sepa-
rately categorize cooperative bargaining uses, it is believed that FMCS
conducted no more than a dozen PAST-based cooperative bargaining ses-
sions in the 1989-91 period. These early pilots were overwhelmingly suc-
cessful in reaching agreements.
A brief review of the PAST model is a helpful framework for under-
standing obstacles to successful use of the process and current best prac-
tice in cooperative bargaining. As mentioned above, PAST stands for:
Principles, Assumptions, Steps, and Techniques, and it forms the back-
bone of the workings of the process: 6
Principles:
1. Focus on issues, not on personalities.
2. Focus on interests, not on positions.
3. Seek mutual gain.
4. Use a fair method to determine outcome.
Assumptions:
1. Bargaining enhances the parties' relationship.
2. Both parties can win in bargaining.
3. Parties should help each other win.
4. Open and frank discussion and information sharing expands the areas of mutual
interests, and this in turn expands the options available to the parties.
5. Mutually developed standards for evaluating options can move decision making
away from reliance on power.
Steps:
1. Pre-Bargaining Steps:
A. Prepare for bargaining.
B. Develop opening statements.
2. Bargaining Steps:
A. Agree on a list of issues.
B. Identify interests on one issue.
C. Develop options on one issue.
D. Create acceptable standards.
6. JEROME T. BARRETr. A SUCCESSFUL MODEL FOR INTEREST-BASED COLLECnVE BARGAINING
AND PARTNERING IN THE PUBUC SECTOR 4:5 (1996).
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E, Test options with standards to achieve a solution or setlemeaL
Techniques:
1. Idea charting.
2. Brainstorming.
3. Consensus decision-making.
An integral prelude to the PAST model is joint training for bargain-
ing teams that intend to use this win-win bargaining model for their up-
coming negotiations.
For FMCS mediators, the first five years using the PAST-type of in-
terest-based negotiation revealed consistent patterns of experience on both
the positive and negative sides. On the positive side, the end results of an
IBB bargaining session were invariably an agreement, an improved rela-
tionship and understanding between the bargainers, and a favorable view
toward future use. There were several negatives as well. First, the process
consumed an enormous amount of time and energy, required almost con-
stant third-party facilitation, and created a mountain of information on flip
charts, all of which hampered the efficiency of the process. Second, the
PAST model's insistence on delayed handling of economic issues meant
that even the most cooperative parties were surprised with the challenges
posed by difficult economic issues midway through the process. Finally, it
was never uncommon for a lengthy PAST process to consume 15, 20 or
even 25 days of bargaining sessions.
Though the PAST model of interest-based negotiation had some
problems, the benefits far outweighed the drawbacks. PAST conclusively
demonstrated that parties could bargain labor contracts cooperatively
through the use of a carefully structured process. At that time, reading
Walton and McKersie's work on integrative bargaining, one was struck by
how seldom the authors offered examples of successful interest-based la-
bor negotiations. Was it because they felt that the design of a truly in-
tegrative bargaining process remained elusive? Other important contribu-
tors, such as Fisher and Ury, offered a powerful vision of integrative
bargaining that seemed difficult to apply to the hard realities of labor-
management collective bargaining. As far as FMCS was concerned, the
PAST model of cooperative negotiation was an integrative process that es-
sentially worked - not once, but time and again.
FMCS mediators were enthusiastic about PAST's successes. Success
rates are important, to be sure, but PAST excited mediators for another
reason: it offered them options to bring to their clients. Mediators often
5
Brommer et al.: Cooperative Bargaining Styles at FMCS: A Movement Toward Choices
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2002
worked with parties who had developed viable, cooperative working rela-
tionships during the administration of their contract. In these situations, it
felt like a step backward to help the parties use traditional adversarial bar-
gaining to negotiate their successor contract. With an interest-based pro-
cess, the mediator could offer these clients a negotiating method that more
closely matched the tone of their normal relationship. This was the origi-
nal power of the PAST model: it brought a new, cooperative style of bar-
gaining to the table for parties that wanted it and could use it.
Though they were enthusiastic, FMCS mediators worked individually
and collectively to identify the causes of some of the PAST model's
drawbacks. PAST's important role as the first practical interest-based ne-
gotiation process made it critical for FMCS to conduct a careful analysis
of the model's pros and cons in order to learn from the experiences. The
negative aspects of PAST were identified as stemming principally from
six distinct areas:
i. Vagueness and lack of specificity in the way issues were placed on the agenda.
2. Developing interests without first holding a group discussion about the issue.
3. The process drive to exhaust all possible interests before moving to options.
4. The , rocess requirement that standards be brainstormed for each issue anew.
5. The laek of prior discussion, understanding, or training on dealing with economic
issues.
6. The sheer burden caused by the magnitude of items flip-charted and placed on
the wall (this problem was further exacerbated by the volume of interests noted
in #2 above).
Initially, the identification of issues was done in short phrases, e.g.
"leave of absence", "sick leave", or "health insurance". The placing of an
issue on the bargaining table indicated the desire for some change. In stark
contrast to traditional bargaining, the interest-based process operates without
proposals. In interest-based negotiation, the bare listing of the issue serves as
the starting point. If for example, there was confusion over the meaning of
"holiday" and "vacation" in conjunction with the use of a personal leave
day, simply listing "leave of absence" as the issue left open the question of
which of the three contractual pages on 'leave' was at issue. Thus, with
PAST, moving immediately to identify issues left the parties with an overly
generalized list in which the issues had not been properly focused.
Moving into the interest-generating phase of the PAST process without a
more focused discussion of the issues led to a lack of focus as the group
moved into the next phase of the process. It also placed half the group at a
potential disadvantage. While the group placing the issue on the agenda was
clear about the issue, the rest of the group was left to infer the specific nature
of the issue from the dialogue as the process moved forward.
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Another concern with using PAST stemmed from the bargainers' accul-
turation that predisposed them to think in terms of solutions, or options,
rather than interests. Even with adequate PAST training, it proved challenging
for experienced bargainers to think comfortably about all the interests under-
lying the issues on the table prior to searching for solutions. While using the
PAST model, often bargainers were not adequately encouraged to uncover all
the relevant interests. This fact, coupled with inadequate issue definition, usu-
ally resulted in a proliferation of extraneous issues that bogged down the bar-
gaining process in a morass of delay and consequently left the bargainers
feeling profoundly dissatisfied with the process.
It was also felt that PAST engendered confusion over how to develop
and administer a list of standards, or criteria, necessary to ensure that options
generated satisfied the interests so carefully enumerated during the bargaining
process. At first, PAST suggested that parties use a joint, consensus-based
brainstorming session to set criteria for each issue on the table, giving the
groups an ability to express their own value set and thus take ownership of
their own standards. Early PAST bargaining trials showed this process to be
so time consuming that it became easier to develop a "standardized" list of
criteria that could be employed in every PAST bargaining session. These cri-
teria were: acceptable to constituents, fair and equitable, understandable and
simple, workable and manageable, affordable and cost effective, flexible, and
mutually beneficial. Though this system helped expedite a PAST bargaining
process, the groups did not participate in the development of the criteria.
Therefore, they were not encouraged to check whether the options generated
satisfied the list of interests. This in turn reinforced the tendency of groups to
ignore the interests list, and in this way, the entire value of an interest-based
process was diminished.
Dealing with economic issues soon became the most troublesome aspect
of using the PAST model. Parties were encouraged by mediators to use the
PAST process to handle non-economic issues first, and then economic issues
second. By the time the parties were able to get to the critical economic is-
sues, they regularly became anxious, hesitant, more guarded, and less secure
in the PAST process. Mediator activities would then shift noticeably from fa-
cilitation roles to traditional mediation roles. Interestingly, this difficulty oc-
curred at the same juncture - when it was time to handle economic issues -
in each PAST negotiation. Labor-management folklore surrounding interest-
based negotiation began to describe the process as effective for non-economic
issues but undesirable for economic issues. In short, while the PAST model
7
Brommer et al.: Cooperative Bargaining Styles at FMCS: A Movement Toward Choices
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2002
was a critical learning component for FMCS with regard to the development
of viable interest-based negotiation processes, certain critical drawbacks en-
couraged FMCS mediators and leadership to design the next generation of in-
terest-based processes.
IV. INTEREST-BASED BARdAINING (IBB) EMERGES
During the early 1990s, FMCS mediators and others worked to improve
the process areas of the PAST model that needed improvement, both at the
training and facilitated negotiation stages of the model. By the mid 1990s,
there was sufficient divergence from the PAST model practice that FMCS de-
cided to name the resultant new model: Interest-Based Bargaining.
One of the strengths of FMCS has always been the high degree of pro-
fessional freedom among the mediators to try new approaches to dispute me-
diation. FMCS continues to encourage experimentation on all process models,
and the next section of this paper discusses the current version of IBB as
FMCS mediators practice it (and also how it is taught during the 200 hours
of required training for new FMCS mediators). Though what follows is the
predominant IBB practice at FMCS, of necessity there continues a diversity
of practice and continued experimentation throughout the agency.
A. Current JBB Best Practice at FMCS
The following is an in-depth discussion of the current FMCS interest-
based bargaining practice:
Information Sharing and Assessment: Typically, parties that have an interest in IBB seek
further information about the process to assist them in making an informed decision about
which bargaining process to choose. The inquiry will usually lead to an opportunity for an
FMCS mediator to meet with the key decision makers, their bargaining teams, and often
with some of the constituents. At this stage, the mediator shares information about the
IBB process and assesses whether the parties are ready, willing and able to adopt a coop-
erative bargaining process for their upcoming contract negotiation.
Those considering using the process must receive a firm grounding of
what IBB is, and is not, as well as realistic expectations of what they can
reasonably expect in the way of results. The term "mutual gains" is fre-
quently thrown around in an imprecise manner. More often than not, parties
come to believe that it means they will get a 'gain' on every issue brought to
the table that is at least equal to the amount of 'gain' they perceive the other
party has achieved. Results that 'fall short' of that expectation lead to the
conclusion that the other side has not bargained 'cooperatively'. Inflated ex-
pectations can doom an otherwise promising IBB negotiation. It is the respon-
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sibility of the mediator to spend sufficient time making sure parties under-
stand that in IBB, mutual gains are not measured issue by issue, nor in toto
on the 'scales of justice'. Rather, IBB can legitimately be expected to provide
sufficient solutions to the interests and needs that emerge during the process -
or offer an understandable rationale as to why those interests cannot be met.
While the parties are learning about the IBB process, the mediator as-
sesses the parties' suitability for IBB. Some groups might never be good can-
didates for use of IBB, while other groups are frequently good candidates. A
third variety of group may possess the potential for successful IBB (and may
even have used EBB in the past), however, extant timing issues that will neg-
atively impact the process would disqualify such groups at that particular
time.
Some assessment indicators that the mediators look for include:
" Evidence of successful labor-management cooperation during the trim of the past
contract
" The willingness of the parties to fully share bargaining information.
" Sufficient time remaining prior to contract expiration to complete the necessary
sequence of assessmentldecision-making, training, and application of the IBB
process.
" A willingness to forego the use of power to secure outcomes.
" The absence of clearly divisive, critical issues andfor fixed positions on important
issues.
" An understanding and acceptance of the process by key decision-makers, bargan-
ing teams and constituents.
" Significant motivation by the parties to change their existing traditional bargaining
styles.
Pre-Bargaining Training
Training of all members of the bargaining teams is critical to successful
use of IBB. The task for team members is not only to learn the steps and
techniques of IBB, but also to learn how extinguish certain traditional bar-
gaining behaviors that will prove fatal to IBB.
A typical EBB training includes a concept presentation, followed by a
careful comparison of EBB versus traditional adversarial bargaining. The me-
diator then conducts exercises to "test" the beliefs of the group around the
concept that focusing on interests will result in collaborative problem solving
and ultimately, in a new collective agreement that is bargained cooperatively.
Skills building training in brainstorming, consensus decision-making, and
9
Brommer et al.: Cooperative Bargaining Styles at FMCS: A Movement Toward Choices
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2002
communication practices follow the belief "test." The training then moves to
the practical side: the group must now apply IBB elements to a mock labor
issue.
The training culminates with a simulated labor dispute that tests the
teams' ability to work the IBB process to completion. A failure to reach suc-
cessful conclusion during the simulation will signal the mediator to recom-
mend that the parties retain their traditional bargaining method. At the con-
clusion of the training, a separate caucus is held by each party to allow the
group, with the guidance of the FMCS facilitator, to explore the feasibility of
using IBB.
Pre-Negotiation Meeting
Prior to the actual start of the negotiations, the parties need to meet to
accomplish the following four tasks:
1. Develop ground rules under which the bargaining will be conducted;
2. Develop rules providing for a smooth transition to traditional bargaining without
litigation in the event that the IBB process breaks down;
3. Exchange lists of issues to be bargained, including grouping and sequencing;
4. Focus the issues.
The following is a more detailed discussion of these tasks:
1. Bargaining Ground Rules: When engaging in traditional bargaining,
there is little discussion or need to address ground rules (except in the public
sector). Most bargaining teams, and especially committee spokespersons, have
significant experience in the rituals that constitute the unwritten "rules"
under which the process is conducted. Parties engaging in IBB must receive
specific guidance concerning the "rules of the road." Team composition,
questions of quorum, timing and scheduling of meetings, communications al-
lowed outside the bargaining teams, and methods of documenting tentative
agreements are all examples of important considerations that are better ad-
dressed prior to the start of negotiations. This is a continuation of the estab-
lishment of group norms that begins during the training phase. 7 Group norms
will develop early on during the training. The question is, will they form ran-
domly, or by conscious design?
2. Transitional Ground Rules: Cooperative bargaining must be a volun-
tary process by definition. Any attempts to enforce cooperation are self-
defeating. Therefore, parties must be encouraged to anticipate the questions
7. Deborah Ancona et al., The Group and What Happens on the Way to Yes, 6 NooinA.
"nON J.,155, 160-161 (Spring 1991).
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that will arise if the process falters to the point that one or both parties
choose to abandon IBB and return to traditional bargaining. Transitional
ground rules will provide the answers to the questions that would inevitably
arise if an IBB session failed. These include questions of notice to the other
side, handling of tentative agreements already reached, and ability to add
agenda items, among others.
3. Exchange of Issues: One of the flaws noted in the PAST model (as
it was originally practiced) was the failure to be sufficiently specific when
listing issues for the agenda. After much experimentation with problem state-
ments, and various other forms of problem questions, the following guidance
is now given to all parties in order to provide sufficient detail at the issue-
exchanging phase:
Pose the issue in the form of a question which cannot be answered with a single word
and which contains within its borders no hint of a solution to the issue. If there is rele-
vant contract language currently existing in the contract, include the appropriate citation
as reference.
4. Focus the Issues: The mediator will work with the group to frame
each issue, often by forcing the group to come up with detailed reasons and
the background that led one or both parties to bring a particular issue to the
bargaining table in the first place. This will help the group identify the spe-
cific nature of each issue, as well as the boundaries that frame the issue. Em-
phasis on focusing the issue at this stage greatly shortens the time necessary
to process the issues, enables groups to avoid discussion of unrelated matters,
and aids in reducing the number of interests expressed that are irrelevant to
the actual problem.
The FMCS mediator will now bring the group through the IBB process.
First, the parties will develop a list of interests (on both sides) that accom-
pany each issue. Generally speaking, FMCS experience with IBB sessions has
shown that the parties should be limited to nine important interests for either
the union or management on any one issue. Mediator emphasis on enforcing
this guideline (which is introduced in training, and stressed throughout the
process) has been a very effective mechanism to reduce the time and energy
expended on the IBB process without sacrificing the creativity, quality and
efficacy of resolutions reached.
11
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Standards
Now the group is ready to develop standards that will serve to measure
the efficacy and acceptability of the problem-solving options that are gener-
ated during the brainstorming step. Though older models of IBB encouraged
groups to develop long lists of standards, the current best practice employs a
three-stage Factor Analysis System (FAS). The FAS brings each option (or
grouping of options) generated through three different levels of analysis, one
stage at a time. If the option proves feasible at one stage, the group will ad-
vance that option to the next stage; each option is tested in this fashion. Op-
tions that pass all three stages are submitted for inclusion in the tentative
agreement.
The individual stages of the FAS work as follows:
Stage 1: The Feasibility Factor. The group holds up the option and an-
swers the following question:
Is this option capable of being done or carried out?
Important considerations in this analysis are legality, affordability or cost
effectiveness, workability, practicability or manageability, understandability or
simplicity, and flexibility.
Stage II: The Benefit Factor. In this stage, the group investigates the
extent to which the option considered will contribute to an improvement in
the condition that underlies the issue raised. This stage links the interests de-
veloped with the options brainstormed to see how well the option raised will
do. The following questions help define Stage II:
* Does this option satisfy important interests listed?
* Does this option harm any important interests of either group?
It is important to note that if mutually exclusive options offered are of
equal value, the option that provides the greatest mutual value should be
chosen.
Stage III: The Acceptability Factor. At this third stage, the group must
examine whether both parties' constituents will receive the option favorably.
This analysis may require a discussion of how the overall agreement, or ten-
tative agreement, will look. Though not all parts of the agreement will be
equally liked, it is valid to apply this test to any piece of the overall picture.
The fundamental question is whether the option generated will stand the test
of formal approval, i.e., will the union refuse to ratify over this issue, or will
top managers refuse to approve a deal that includes this issue. The following
questions help refine the acceptability factor.
• If one or both parties' constituents will not approve this option, why not?
12
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" Are there political problems connected with this option?
* How can this option be re-worked to make it acceptable while enabling it to
maintain compliance with stages I and II?
It is difficult, but necessary to avoid discussing interests and solutions
during this third stage. For example, "vacations" is too broad an issue
description. "How to schedule vacations during peak periods when more em-
ployees than can be accommodated desire the time?" gives better focus for
efficient team processing.
Handling Economic Issues
In dealing with economics, the fundamental flaw in the early practice of
interest-based processes was the premature and seemingly inexorable move-
ment into distributive bargaining. Greater rapport was the primary distinguish-
ing characteristic between economic issue bargaining under interest-based and
the traditional model. It happened with such frequency that attention focused
on constructs that would facilitate a settlement under that expectation. Once
such device was the use of an "ABC filter.
The strategy underlying the "ABC filter" is to postpone to as late as
possible, the final decisions that eventually have to be made. There are two
reasons for doing this. First, since so much is interrelated, an early position-
ing on any one issue may have been avoided by later discussions or decisions
on other economic issues. Second, the farther you can get in the process, the
greater the motivation of the parties to try to reach a cooperative conclusion.
Listed below are the steps for using a filtering mechanism:
1. Place in order the final set of issues that need discussion and resolution. Direct
compensation is always last.
2. Take the first issue and follow the IBB steps of focusing the issue, developing
interests, and brainstorming options.
3. Categorize the options into one of three categories by group consensus:
A-TA regardless of what the rest of the economic package might be.
B-Eliminate regardless of what the rest of the economic package might be.
C-Hold for later consideration.
4. Work the remaining issues one by one through the A-B-C filter.
5. Those options remaining in the C category ar all that is left to beprocc to
obtain a final contract TA.
While helpful, these devices when used too early undermine the potential
power that should be the most important reason for using the IBB process,
the opportunity for the parties to create wealth by applying their joint creativ-
13
Brommer et al.: Cooperative Bargaining Styles at FMCS: A Movement Toward Choices
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2002
ity to the parties' important interests before focusing on how to distribute that
wealth. In its most succinct form this is usually stated as, "Expand the pie
before slicing it up".
Best practice to accomplish this involves a short intervention by the
facilitator just before starting the economic issues to reaffirm this principle,
and then concentrating on the interest step and brainstorming step of the pro-
cess as parties process the economic issues. Finally, the facilitator should be
prepared to more actively intervene to counteract the parties' tendency to fall
into distributive bargaining.
B. Observed Results
FMCS has been clear from the outset that it regards IBB as an alterna-
tive to traditional bargaining, not as the next step in the evolution of collec-
tive bargaining. IBB is not, and should not, be seen as a replacement to the
traditional adversarial bargaining model with which bargaining parties are so
familiar. Among the potential advantages that the IBB process offers are:
I. An enhanced and cooperative relationship,
2. Heightened respect and trust between the parties,
3. An agreement containing more elegant solutions in terms of needs and
permanence.
Because it is a cooperative process, those labor and management groups
that have achieved a cooperative relationship during the administration of
their collective bargaining agreements are likely candidates for a fruitful IBB
process. In this way their contract negotiation approach will be consistent
with the rest of their relationship. Since IBB is also a problem-solving pro-
cess, those parties who have complex, information laden, or changing-
relationship issues to manage can benefit from the use of the model.
An evaluation of IBB then, logically, would measure three dimensions:
1. If IBB is an alternative rather than an experiment, do substantial numbers of bar-
gainers know of the process, have they tried it, and are they favorably disposed
toward it?
2. Is IBB better suited to longer-term solutions that require improvements in the
strength of the relationship? There should at least be some evidence that IBB ne-
gotiations involve issues that deal with relationship change more frequently than
traditional negotiations.
3. If IBB engenders a cooperative relationship, do parties using the approach show
a positive change in their relationship following use of the process (holding in-
tervening variables constant)?
While there is much anecdotal evidence from FMCS mediators regarding
IBB and comparisons to traditional negotiations, hard data is still scarce.
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FMCS case statistics provides some general information regarding volume of
use, issues on the table, and level of strike/lockout activity. Also, there is
some data available from the 1999 national random-sample survey of union
and management lead bargainers conducted for the FMCS to fulfill the Fed-
eral Government's National Performance Review requirement.
FMCS case statistics show that FMCS has been actively involved in
slightly over 1500 LBB negotiations in the last five years. This represents an
average of 5.44% of total contract negotiations involving an FMCS mediator,
ranging from a low of 2.6% in 1996 to a high of 6% in 2000, and 5.4% in
the most recent fiscal year. Data from the 1999 survey report that "over 80
percent of union negotiators and 67% of management negotiators were famil-
iar with IBB and a majority of both sets had used these techniques." 8 Further,
seventy percent of management negotiators and approximately half of union
bargainers prefer the process to traditional bargaining.9 Finally, the survey re-
vealed that IBB was rated good to excellent by between 60 and 77% of nego-
tiators who used the process.' 0 While IBB has not emerged as the most
widely used form of FMCS dispute mediation activities, the consistent level
of activity over a five-year period, favorable reviews, and a high level of
awareness among labor negotiators all emphasize that IBB has left the experi-
mental phase and become a useful bargaining alternative.
Longitudinal data has not been collected to determine whether IBB
reduces either the volume of issues on the table and/or the perennial repeti-
tion of difficult relationship issues. While anecdotal evidence from FMCS
mediators supports these hypotheses, there is a clear need for formalized sta-
tistical research. FMCS case data supports the hypothesis that relationship is-
sues will be more frequently found on the IBB table, and "bread-and-butter"
economic issues less frequently on the table, when compared with traditional
bargaining. An analysis of negotiations involving mediators showed that be-
tween 1996 and 2001, the occurrence of working conditions was an issue in
EBB negotiations 14% to 26% more frequently than in traditional bargaining
cases. Similarly, work reorganization was an issue in IBB negotiations 7% to
14%% more frequently than in traditional bargaining cases. Conversely,
wages showed up in traditional bargaining cases between 11% and 23% more
8. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., Final Report on the Second National Performance Re-
view Survey for the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 6 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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frequently than in IBB cases, and pension issues 10% to 16% more frequently
than in 1BB. These results match expectations. A study of contract changes
bargained in Canada showed a similar pattern, and it concluded that IBB pro-
vided more innovative changes in collective bargaining agreements than did
traditionally bargained agreements."
An analysis of FMCS case data from 1995 to 2001 also shows that
FMCS mediators were actively involved in approximately 400 negotiations a
year in which there was a work stoppage or lockout. This represents approxi-
mately 8% of the total number of dispute mediations per year, on average. In
principle, mediators are only involved in traditional negotiations when there
are difficulties. Therefore, it is not surprising that in a high percentage of ne-
gotiations with FMCS involvement there is a work stoppage or lockout. What
is surprising is that for the same period of time (1995-2001), there have been
only three work stoppages and lockouts out of 1500 interest-based negotia-
tions involving FMCS mediators. As part of the assessment phase of IBB,
mediators look for concrete signs of a positive relationship, and therefore will
seldom offer an IBB process to the parties with the most difficult relation-
ships. However, clearly the data warrant further analysis: three work actions
out of 1500 IBB negotiations in a 5 year period is a surprising statistic even
for the most experienced FMCS mediators.
V. BEYOND INTEREST BASED BARGAINING
Originally parties were limited to two distinct bargaining models, tradi-
tional adversarial and IBB, each located at opposite ends of the spectrum.
Since IBB is not a step in the evolution of collective bargaining, it will not
and should not be seen as the only alternative to the traditional bargaining
processes that parties have embraced. IBB is an option that offers distinct ad-
vantages in a proper setting. In order to make IBB successful, however, both
parties must be sufficiently committed and trusting to fully share information.
Further, parties must also be ready and able to work toward integrative solu-
tions. All, or most, of the issues must lend themselves to cooperative resolu-
tion, and constituents on both sides must embrace a cooperative relationship.
An analysis of IBB negotiations that break down shows two likely situa-
tions. The first involves an unsuccessful IBB effort in which parties are able
to resolve many, even most, of the issues before the process comes unhinged
when it is time to address the economic issues. In the second instance, the
level of group cooperation is not high enough for the participants to reach
11. Renaud Paquet et al., Does Interest-Based Bargaining (IBB) Really Make a Difference
in Collective Bargaining Outcomes?, 16 NEGOTIATION J. 281, 292-293 (Summer 2000).
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consensus on some, or all, of the potential options for resolution of the
issues.
Until recently, numerous parties to a collective bargaining relationship
that desire to employ a cooperative process, and can benefit from a successful
one, have had only one choice: IBB. Unfortunately, for reasons mentioned
above, IBB is not suitable for all labor-management collective bargaining re-
lationships. The result is that in between those groups persisting with tradi-
tional bargaining and those groups that are compatible with an EBB process
there exists a potentially large population of bargainers desiring some level of
cooperative relationship, but do not have a cooperative process to employ.
It is for these groups that Modified Traditional Bargaining ("MTB") and
Enhanced Cooperative Negotiation ("ECN") have been specifically devel-
oped. There may be a group early on the path to a collaborative relationship
seeking to increase its level of cooperation at the bargaining table. Or, per-
haps a group desires cooperation but recognizes that it will face some clearly
divisive issues that do not lend themselves to a cooperative resolution. Or in
a third scenario, perhaps a group faced with a challenging business environ-
ment is forced to cooperate for survival, however, circumstances surrounding
the labor-management relationship are proving challenging. For all these
cases, and others, where groups seeking to cooperate may find full consensus
at the bargaining table impossible to achieve, MTB or ECN offer realistic, at-
tractive options beyond IBB.
VI. MODIFIED TRADmONAL BARGAINING
Though the results of increased use of IBB in labor-management negoti-
ations were encouraging, the problems identified by field mediators with the
EBB process, as well as the sheer extremity of the departure from the tradi-
tional adversarial model, rendered the B process unsuitable for many nego-
tiating parties. Further, in addition to the technical, logistical and practical
hurdles that parties looking for an alternative (non-adversarial) bargaining
process would face, often the political circumstances surrounding a particular
labor-management relationship made it unlikely that EBB could gain accept-
ance. On the other hand, the experience with EBB clearly demonstrated that
introducing negotiating parties to the concept of underlying interests - what
were they, how to identify them, and what their value was to the bargaining
relationship - was a powerful means of conflict resolution within bargaining.
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The FMCS leadership felt the agency should investigate the possibility
of increasing parties' exposure to the value of exploring "underlying inter-
ests" for bargaining purposes without necessitating a comprehensive IBB
training. Four FMCS mediators with extensive experience in the development
and use of the IBB process formed a committee in early 1999 to address this
question. The task was to identify and refine an interest-based process that
would allow for an easy reversion to traditional adversarial collective bargain-
ing in order to close issues left outstanding by the interest-based process.
Practitioners dubbed the resulting bargaining model "Modified Traditional
Bargaining," or MTB.
MTB was the first negotiating model formally developed by FMCS in an
attempt to cover the middle ground between the traditional adversarial model
and the alternative IBB model. A large population of potential clients for
MTB existed among groups that desired and were capable of a more coopera-
tive approach than traditional collective bargaining offered, but that were not
ready to achieve the levels of consensus required for a successful IBB effort.
MTB was conceived as an alternative model to both traditional bargaining
and IBB, and it was designed to capitalize on parties' desire for greater de-
grees of interest sharing, problem-solving, enhanced communication and in-
formation sharing that were needed to fulfill their mutual desire for a cooper-
ative process without requiring the level of commitment required by IBB.
The premise underlying MTB is simple: levels of ability to cooperate
vary widely, and the collections of issues brought to the table are likely to
span a full spectrum of potential for collaborative resolution. MTB enables
parties interested in cooperation to maximize the cooperative potential in bar-
gained issues. On a continuum defined by traditional adversarial bargaining at
one end, and IBB at the other end, MTB falls roughly near the middle, but
closer to the IBB side of the spectrum. Similar to IBB, a formal training ses-
sion is required, and the actual negotiation is conducted in a structured
fashion.
A. The MTB Process Examined
Generally speaking, the MTB process works as follows: first, parties
share their respective issues to be negotiated as problems, not as proposals or
positions; next, for each issue parties will start by sharing their interests, and
then explore interest-based options for resolution of the issue. If no resolution
is forthcoming and the parties have exhausted their discussion, they may ne-
gotiate the issue using a traditional bargaining approach. In this traditional
bargaining phase, parties are free to develop positions or proposals based on
the interests that have been discussed. Herein lies one of the most valuable
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aspects of MTB: after an interest-based discussion, the proposals offered are
more likely to fall within the realistic range of settlement as opposed to an
extreme position that the offering party knows will be immediately rejected.
In short, MTB encourages information sharing to enhance problem solving
and thus improve the parties' relationship by demonstrating how cooperative
development of interest-based options can lead to swift resolution.
More specifically, an FMCS mediator will conduct the following steps to
implement an MTB process:
Initial Inquiry and Assessment: The mediator will make a group presen-
tation outlining the fundamental expectations, helpful guidelines, steps and
techniques necessary for MTB. In particular, the mediator will also assess the
parties for some of the following indicators of what will make a good MTB
candidate, such as evidence of commitment to developing a cooperative rela-
tionship, willingness of the parties to share important bargaining information,
sufficient time to complete the MTB process prior to contract expiration, a
willingness to forego the use of power as a first choice to secure outcomes,
and an understanding and acceptance of the process by all the constituents.
Training: All members of both bargaining teams must be trained in the
steps and techniques of MTB in order for the effort to be successful. Further,
the training must take care to minimize or extinguish the emergence of traits
and behaviors instinctive to seasoned traditional bargainers that would prove
fatal for an MTB process.
Pre-bargaining: Prior to bargaining, parties must (1) reach agreement on
ground rules for the bargaining sessions, and (2) exchange the issues that will
be bargained, including necessary groupings and sequencing of these issues.
Facilitated MTB Process: It is necessary for a skilled facilitator to con-
duct the actual bargaining sessions. The fundamental expectations for the
MTB sessions should be clear to both parties, such as: parties prefer coopera-
tion, effort will be expended to solve problems, negotiations can enhance re-
lationships, and mutual gain is required to ensure ratification and acceptance.
Once the above conditions are met, the three-part MTB process can be-
gin. In Phase I, parties will work with non-economic issues believed to pos-
sess a high potential for cooperative problem solving. In Phase I, non-
economic issues with a low potential for cooperative problem solving will be
considered. Finally, in Phase III, the economic issues will be addressed.
In Phase I, the parties treat the issue much the same way they would
during the option generation stage of an IBB session: they focus the issue,
share interests and generate options. After this has occurred, the parties then
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have a "resolution discussion" based on the options. MTB differs from IBB
here in that the application of standards or criteria is not required, and fur-
ther, in that consensus is not mandatory. If resolution is reached, the parties
treat it as a tentative agreement. If there is no resolution, the issue is placed
in a holding bin for later discussion.
In Phase II, the parties focus their list of issues, and share their interests
on outstanding issues. Once all the issues have been discussed, the parties
caucus privately and develop proposals on their own issues. From this point
the parties exchange proposals and negotiate as they would in a traditional
bargaining setting until resolution is reached. Resolved issues are treated as
tentative agreements, and unresolved issues are placed in the holding bin.
In Phase III the parties tackle their economic issues. They focus their
particular concerns, share their interests and make financial presentations. Fol-
lowing this step, the parties proceed to bargain traditionally on all outstanding
economic and non-economic issues.
VII. MTB: BENEFITS AND CONCERNS
MTB has a high utility in situations where the parties' relationship is not
fully collaborative and there is a measure of unwillingness to share informa-
tion. The broad appeal of MTB in these situations has an additional political
benefit: the negotiators themselves are able to report to their constituents that
they are not "selling out" by engaging in MTB, rather, they are engaging in
a certain quantity of collaborative problem solving, and if they are not suc-
cessful, they will naturally transition to traditional bargaining.
Though sharing information is encouraged, MTB differs significantly
from IBB in that there is no requirement to completely share information.
This makes MTB attractive to many private sector employers who are loathe
to disclose financial and other sensitive information. MTB further differs from
IBB on the issue of consensus. IBB requires consensus for all decisions, and
those decisions must conform to standards. Some parties prefer a simpler
"common sense" discussion in order to reach their decision, and they are
easily distracted by the rigid delineation of criteria required by the IBB
process.
On the other hand, for parties who have used IBB, or simply place a
high value on reaching consensus in a problem-solving situation, MTB can
prove troubling. MTB does not require the development of criteria, or stan-
dards, like an IBB session does. Some groups experience difficulty reaching
decisions without objective standards. Further, resolution discussions tend to
be more "aimless."
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Some of the criticisms of MTB come from the mediators themselves.
For example, many mediators feel that MTB does not differ significantly
enough from IBB to make it a useful model: mediators that could not use
IBB with certain groups would not consider using MTB with those same
groups. In addition, for groups interested in a collaborative problem-solving
model that are not ready for IBB, MTB's participatory format may present
additional challenges, for example, to bargaining committees that are unwill-
ing to abandon their leadership structure.
Finally, the emphasis MTB places on information sharing makes it an
unlikely alternative to IBB for private sector employers unwilling to offer, for
example, full financial disclosure in the name of collaborative problem-
solving. Though it is less structured than IBB, MTB still encourages informa-
tion sharing at its core. This will suit parties unconcerned about sensitive or
proprietary information, however, it does little to increase the field of options
for employers looking for alternatives to traditional bargaining but are unwill-
ing to share information.
Viii. MM: OBSERVED RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
FMCS mediators have employed the MTB process in dispute mediation
approximately fifteen times over the last three years. Mediator reports suggest
that MTB has been extremely successful: according to several mediators, par-
ties that bargained using MTB reached settlements that were superior to what
they would have achieved using a traditional adversarial approach. As ex-
pected by the designers, mediators reported that MTB worked well for groups
that were not ready to commit to a pure interest-based process such as IBB.
Further, several mediators reported that groups employing MTB completed
their bargaining process with a better relationship than the parties had exper-
ienced prior to the beginning of the contract negotiations. For some groups,
the knowledge that the MTB could be abandoned at any time in favor of
traditional bargaining gave the participants a high level of comfort with the
MTB process.
Problems with MTB included a feeling among one participating union
that management had abused the MTB process in order to force a sub-par
compensation package. In another case, the enhanced cooperative relationship
the parties gained through their MTB negotiations was destroyed when the
principals departed; the relationship worsened and subsequent negotiations
were conducted using the traditional adversarial model. Finally, one particular
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group opposed to using IBB did not see any benefit to using MTB; it was
felt that the requisite training period and structured nature of MTB was no
different from the IBB process, and since these caveats were the principle de-
tractors in the first place, MTB did not present a viable alternative to IBB in
this particular case.
As discussed above, and in terms of a continuum of alternative bargain-
ing processes, MTB represents a moderate step away from IBB in the direc-
tion of traditional bargaining methods. FMCS considers its development and
utilization to be successful. As with all dispute mediation tools, however, oc-
casions for use must be carefully vetted, and candidate parties must display
the required level of commitment to the process in advance. Certain parties,
however, will wish for a bargaining process that encourages a discussion of
interests, yet eschews a lengthy training and a formalized negotiation system.
In response to these needs, FMCS extended the continuum of interest-based
processes further: toward Enhanced Cooperative Negotiation.
IX. ENHANCED COOPERATIVE NEGOTIATION
Though FMCS mediators began to employ the MTB process for inter-
ested parties almost immediately after the development committee finished its
work, they found that the similarities between the MTB process and IBB
made MTB unsuitable in many situations. Specifically, the formalized nature
of the MTB process (for some parties, MTB appeared similar to an IBB pro-
cess), the emphasis on information sharing, and the radical departure from the
traditional adversarial bargaining structure rendered MTB unusable for certain
parties. However, many mediators realized the inherent value of including a
civil discussion of interests that surround the issues while at the traditional
bargaining table. They felt that an interest-based outlook could benefit many
traditional bargaining sessions without severely disrupting the normal flow of
negotiations and discomforting the parties.
Some of the mediators involved with the development of MTB believed
that a less formal, interest-based structure could be layered over traditional
adversarial collective bargaining situations. In the fall of 1999, FMCS
mediators began offering their clientele a new approach to bargaining: En-
hanced Cooperative Negotiation, or ECN. ECN was placed squarely between
traditional bargaining and MTB on the bargaining process continuum, thus
creating a full spectrum of dispute resolution process options for the mediator
to utilize. ECN was clear about its goals. It had to be simple; not require ex-
tensive training; not interfere with the parties' normal bargaining committee
structures; promote communication and an understanding of interests that lie
underneath the issues; and utilize the traditional bargaining process.
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A. The ECN Process Examined
ECN can roughly be described as a three-part process: (1) mediator-
facilitated issue preparation and exchange; (2) proposal preparation and ex-
change; and (3) traditional collective bargaining. As with IBB or MTB, any
ECN initiative will be preceded by an initial inquiry and assessment, con-
ducted by the mediator. The mediator will make a group presentation outlin-
ing the fundamental expectations, helpful guidelines, steps and techniques
necessary for ECN. As with MTB, the mediator will also assess the parties
for some of the following indicators of what will make good ECN candidates,
such as: parties that already have a good working relationship, parties who
are not candidates for IBB or MTB, evidence of commitment to increasing
cooperative efforts beyond traditional adversarial bargaining, willingness of
the parties to share individual interests and explore joint interests, sufficient
time to complete the ECN process prior to contract expiration, and an under-
standing and acceptance of the process by all the constituents.
Once the mediator has determined that ECN could be applicable to a
particular group of parties and their bargaining situation, he or she will con-
duct an ECN Overview session. During the overview, the mediator educates
the parties about the value of exploring interests during the bargaining pro-
cess, and how traditional bargaining overlooks this important element. The
overview also stresses the need for parties to limit their issues and to only
deal with what must be changed at the bargaining table in order for the labor-
management relationship to continue for a successor contract. The overview
culminates with a facilitated discussion about what type of experience the
parties want, or expect to have, for their upcoming bargaining. If the mediator
determines that the parties are ready to commit to the process, the ECN will
go forward as follows:
Training: A six-hour training session is all that is required (versus two
days for IBB). The main objectives of the training are to make sure the par-
ticipants understand how to properly frame and focus their issues; differenti-
ate between interests and positions; improve their communication skills; and
familiarize themselves with the remainder of the ECN process. The training is
also designed to help the parties get to know each other prior to the bargain-
ing, in order to create a more relaxed bargaining atmosphere.
Issue Preparation: Subsequent to the training, the parties meet in sepa-
rate caucuses to identify their issues. No positions, solutions or proposals are
developed at this time. The parties simply identify their issues, and then list
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each issue on its own separate "issue form". Each issue form contains space
for the parties to state the issue, and then list the interests that underlie the is-
sue. The issue forms are collected and submitted to the mediator, who re-
views them to make certain they are complete and in the proper format. The
mediator uses the issues to assemble a bargaining agenda - a sequenced list
of all the non-economic issues that the parties must address.
Pre-Negotiation Meeting: The parties come together for a pre-negotiation
meeting, for two reasons. First, the ground rules for the negotiation will be
established. The mediator will assist the parties to establish their own ground
rules, however, for a successful ECN effort, the mediator will normally in-
clude four additional ground rules:
" The parties agree to craft proposals on all issues in the bargaining agenda, even if
the proposal is to maintain status quo on a particular issue; the parties also agree
to offer their rationale for each proposal they craft.
" The parties agree to take into account as many joint interests as possible when
crafting proposals.
" During negotiations, non-economic issues will be handled first and resolved to the
greatest possible extent prior to handling economic issues.
" If the parties reach impasse, they agree in advance to re-engage the mediator prior
to taking any form of adverse work action.
The second part of the pre-negotiation meeting is the issues exchange.
The mediator will move through the bargaining agenda, and have each party
exchange their interests on each issue in the agenda. After the initial ex-
change, the parties separate and begin to work on each other's issues, com-
paring their own interests to the other parties' interests on a given issue. The
parties will then meet again in joint session and discuss individual and mutual
interests for each issue; it is critical at this stage that each party record the
other party's interests for each issue. After this exchange is complete, the par-
ties will each have a written record of the issues with a comprehensive list of
all the interests that underlie each issue from both sides.
Proposal Development: After the pre-negotiation meetings have been
completed, the parties receive a period of about one week to prepare their
proposals for the actual negotiations. The parties must craft a proposal for
each of the issues on the bargaining agenda, even if their proposal is to retain
the existing contract language (or the other party's language). Parties are also
required to record their rationale for each proposal to force them to refer to
their interests or the interests of the other party. Further, as specified in the
ground rules, the parties have agreed to try and incorporate as many of each
other's interests as possible into their issue proposals. In this way, ECN en-
courages the parties to craft proposals that will be more realistic, and poten-
tially much closer to the other party's proposal than a traditional bargaining
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setting would encourage. Parties develop a written proposal for each issue on
the bargaining agenda, and copies are prepared for distribution during joint
session.
Proposal Exchange: The mediator convenes the parties in joint session
and facilitates the exchange of proposals. The main reason for the mediator
participation is to ascertain that proposals are exchanged for every item on
the bargaining agenda, and also to ensure that parties offer their rationale be-
hind each proposal, even in a "no change" situation. After the initial round
of proposal exchanges, the mediator exits the meeting and leaves the parties
to continue the process in this manner. The parties proceed down the bargain-
ing agenda, reviewing each other's proposals on each issue, and determine ar-
eas of commonality. Areas of easy agreement are recorded and put aside.
Counter proposals, including the rationales behind the proposals, can be de-
veloped and exchanged. Tougher issues are handled via traditional bargaining
starting from the positions offered in the final round of proposals that are ex-
changed. Additional traditional bargaining sessions are scheduled as needed.
Closure: Proposal exchanges and traditional bargaining proceeds on the
non-economic issues until they are all resolved. Any issues left at impasse
can be re-addressed during the economic issue bargaining sessions. At that
point, economic packages and proposals are introduced, and the parties en-
gage in traditional bargaining to reach closure. Traditional dispute mediation
should be employed at this point if necessary. Parties are reminded that the
ground rules they developed specify an agreement to re-engage the mediator
before any work action will be taken.
X. ECN: OBSERVED RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Since its development in late 1999, FMCS has employed ECN for eight
separate contract negotiations. Five cases were public school systems with
bargaining units sized from 100 to 4800 members. Three cases were in the
private sector, with bargaining units sized from 50 to 300 members. Though
not a statistically significant sampling, mediator-observed results are as
follows:
" Seven out of eight groups have already committed to using ECN for their upcom-
ing contract negotiations;
" All eight ECN mediations settled without any declaration of impasse or advese
work action;
489
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" Seven out of eight groups described their negotiations as having concluded in
"record time;"
* All eight groups found the process to be very efficient.
ECN also enhances the efficacy of the mediator, for several important
reasons:
" Parties have engaged the mediator from the outset of contract negotiations, in a
proactive setting, rather than utilizing the mediator to handle an extant crisis;
" Parties start the bargaining process with a short training period, helping neutralize
competitive tendencies, increasing comfort levels, and enabling the mediator to
get to know the participants before bargaining starts;
" Parties' bargaining positions are brought closer together before actual negotiations
even begin;
" Adverse work actions are reduced or eliminated.
There have been numerous calls from around the country for more infor-
mation on ECN, and FMCS has received several serious requests to have its
mediators conduct ECN contract bargaining in locales nationwide. As it gets
more exposure, the experience will help FMCS refine and augment the pro-
cess as needed. Recent experience, however, indicates that ECN will become
a powerful dispute mediation tool for a wide variety of groups located across
the full spectrum of public, private and industrial activities.
XI. CONCLUSION
All FMCS mediation services are aimed at promoting and improving the
conflict resolution and collective bargaining processes in the United States.
This, in turn, helps American business remain competitive in the global mar-
ketplace, and thus helps increase the American worker's quality of life. As an
organization, FMCS has developed an extensive ability to design and imple-
ment new processes for dispute mediation and conflict resolution interven-
tions. As the options for bargaining increase, and the processes are refined
through study and experience, FMCS moves closer to its stated goal of be-
coming the leading performance-based, customer-focused conflict resolution
organization in the nation.
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